

Dan S. STOICA

“Al.I. Cuza” University of Iași (Romania)

## **What is Jamie Oliver’s Big Knife doing in Midsomer Magna? On Manipulation**

**Abstract:** Traditionally, the term “manipulation” is used in a morally depreciative sense, as a pejorative expression. The present paper tries to propose another view on manipulation as action and thus another perception of the linguistic term. For this, we will leave the territory of moral distinctions (good vs. bad, moral vs. immoral) and go camp in the territory of adequacy, a territory of instruments and their efficiency in usage (the distinction will be good vs. bad, in the sense of the appropriateness and efficiency of the chosen instrument in performing some particular action). Taken as such, the manipulation is no longer viewed as moral or immoral, but simply as amoral. In contrast with that, manipulation will be discussed under the opposition good vs. bad in terms of the pragmatics of the action. We will then accept that there can be morally good manipulation, which also means that an expression like “bad manipulation” is not a pleonasm, but a way to refer to manipulation that didn’t produce the expected effect.

**Keywords:** manipulation, freedom of opinion, argumentation, morality, efficiency

### **1. Problem, answer and first argument in supporting our position**

I will start from an example I use in class in order to let my students choose whether manipulation exists or not in some situations and also whether manipulation is always something bad. Let’s imagine a scene with a mother and her three-year-old son; the mother has to make her son take a prescribed pill at a specific time, and she knows it will be a problem if the little one refuses to take his pills. The mother decides to make use of a trick, knowing that her son also refuses to drink milk, so she would ask “will you take the pill with milk or with water?”. The son will make a fast decision, thinking that he would win, for once, his

dispute with his mother about drinking milk: "with water!", so the pill will be accepted, which was the aim of the strategy.

Now, the questions: (1) Do we have manipulation in the doings of the mother? And (2) Can we say that the manipulation is bad, in this particular case?

Then, the answers: (1) Yes, definitely, the mother is manipulating her son; and (2) No, the manipulation, here, is not bad (the little one will be cured with the help of the pill taken at the right moment).

Trying to understand this phenomenon, we cannot avoid seeing that we deal with a larger one: discursive influence. All discourses influence, this is a fact. Whether we are aware or not, whether we intend it or not, a discourse – any discourse! – affects the environment in which it is produced, determining changes at different levels in the actors involved, in the context and often for the whole world. By making a discourse, one can inform, misinform, lead, mislead, lie, teach, impress, educate, fill in an awkward moment of silence, make someone do something or stop them from doing that thing, make someone agree and support some idea or make them refute that idea. Making a discourse could simply determine a given public to turn around and look to the speaker, keep silent, feel good (or bad!), etc.

How does it work?

Questions arise: is it conviction or is it persuasion? Is it manipulation or not? Is manipulation bad at all times, in any situation? We shall see in the following segments of this study how it works. First of all, we will have a look of the concept of *discourse* and of the relation between discourse and influence.

A discourse is a complex activity, deployed between at least two individuals and acting simultaneously with a rational side and an emotional side, in a given context. These two sides are never in equal ratio, so the effect – the influence over the otherness – will either be the rational comprehension of the thesis exposed by the speaker, or the emotional participation to the position expressed in the discourse. As a context-sensitive activity, the discourse will also modify the context it is produced in and all these alterations will force the participants to reconsider their respective positions (to one self, to each other, to the matter under discussion, etc.). At any rate, any discourse produces influences. Influence over the addressee, influence over the addresser himself, influence over the context, influence over the understanding of past discourses as well as over the construction and the understanding of future discourses. An observation has been made about the fact that

what's been done through discourse cannot ever be undone. It is true and it is of paramount importance for the communication specialists. But it happens that this is not the most important aspect for our development. We will just keep in mind the simple fact that discourses influence people: they inform, they move, they make people take action or they orient their thoughts. Rational discursive instances can inform, teach, educate, but they can also seduce, by the beauty of the ideas exposed and/or by the beauty of the logical concatenation of the ideas. Emotional discursive instances make the addressee fall under this kind of influence, but there can also be a rational effect due to the fact that the addressee would keep cool-headed and ask himself why it is that the addresser tells him that thing and in that particular way. Subjectivity and objectivity melting together on both sides, speaker and hearer. To see it better, we could revisit reference authors.

## **2. A look into Kant's *Logic* and Perelman's *Traité de l'argumentation***

When addressing the issue of the ways of knowing as determined by the modality, Kant analyzes the different ways one can take to get the interlocutor to follow their ideas as presented in one's discourse. Kant sees three such ways which generate: (a) an opinion, (b) a belief, (c) science. To represent something as true, he says, is to make a subjective judgment of the truth (seen as objective characteristic of the knowledge), which will be called "consent"<sup>1</sup>. But there is also the uncertainty which comes along, and this can be the consent altered by the conscience of contingency. Thus there will be three forms the consent can take:

1. If both objectively and subjectively insufficient, the consent will have the form of an opinion;
2. If objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient, the consent will have the form of a belief;
3. If both objectively and subjectively sufficient, the consent will take the form of science.

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that English has many terms to name the *consent*, each of which bring a nuance that could serve the purpose of the present study: *acceptance*, *accord*, *approval*, *approbation* (semantically pointing to reason), but also *willingness*, *ascent*, *sympathy* (semantically pointing to emotions). The readers can opt for one term or another and then enjoy the particular meaning of it and the kind of consent they are talking about.

What Kant also notes is that the difference between belief and opinion does not lie in a difference of degree, but in the relation each of those – as knowledge – has with the action. The belief is a judgement, but a judgement based upon a kind of knowledge which provides subjective foundations to the action (that action the believer intends to take). The same goes for the opinion, where knowledge is even paler (because of the weak foundation – as well objectively as subjectively – of the action). Science will be the only one where the consent is well founded and thus strong and long lasting.

The psychological three steps protocol “identification-internalization-acceptance” is, in fact, a series of three modalities of obtaining conviction or persuasion. The three modalities proposed by Kant could explain how persuasion works in (1) and in (2), while conviction works in (3), each of those modalities being a basis for either acceptance (1) or identification<sup>2</sup> (2) and internalization.

Whatever the set of values or norms, if one shares substance – or is consubstantial – with a given group, then that individual will be more likely to take action when those values are threatened.

It seems that both, Kant construction and the one set up in psychology, are shedding light on our discussion, but we still don't have the separation we need: the distinction between conviction and persuasion. We have always a dominant tonality, and this dominant tonality gives the type of influence a given discourse performs, either rational, or emotional. In his *Treatise of argumentation*, Chaïm Perelman proposes a distinction between these two situations, and he calls a “conviction” the influence realized with a preponderance of the rational action of the discourse, and he calls a “persuasion” the influence realized with the preponderance of the emotional side of the discourse.

### **3. Manipulation**

To take the discussion further, we should notice that learned specialists in discourse frequently mention manipulation as a consequence

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<sup>2</sup> Identification is a central theme in Burke's discussion of rhetoric. In his formulation, identification is a more prominent term than persuasion, as it broadens the role of rhetoric from that of a speaker delivering a persuasive message to one that shows how language, delivered through public relations and other conduits, constructs and reconstructs our realities. (Cf. Kenneth Burke. 1969. *A grammar of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press).

of some types of discourses, but they seldom make it sure that this phenomenon is well defined, properly delimited inside the field of discursive influence, adequately used at any moment<sup>3</sup>. While common discourse can contain utterances like “you are manipulating me”, specialized discourse should not accept that as a true sequence of discourse, simply because we deal with manipulation only when the subject of such influence is not aware of what is happening to them. If I can say “you are manipulating me”, I am aware of what I am subject to, so the kind of influence exerted over me is no longer a manipulation.

On the other hand, the examples given above could well make us ask ourselves about the ethic aspect of manipulating. Obviously, there is no unique answer to that question, and this is because manipulation can be used in both moral directions: good or bad.

So, how are we going to perceive the manipulation, now? Is it good? Is it bad? Is it moral? Is it immoral? Tough questions!

Dumitru Borțun provides a solution: the manipulation is just an instrument, so it cannot be judged in terms of ethics and morals. It is not moral, nor is it immoral: it simply is amoral. What counts from the ethic point of view, what can be discussed in terms of moral vs. immoral is the aim this instrument is being used to. The instrument as such can only be discussed as efficient or inefficient, “good” or “bad” being used to describe nothing but the appropriateness and the efficiency of it.

Take the example of the Cinecittà Studios, near Rome, in Italy. They have been created by Benito Mussolini, in 1937, as a means of propaganda in favor of fascist ideas. Il Duce knew that "*Il cinema è l'arma più forte*" (the cinema is the most powerful weapon) and he didn't hesitate to make use of it. After the war, they didn't tear down the studios and they are still using them to promote quite different ideas from those of the fascist Italy. Is it good to have studios like Cinecittà? Yes! Is it moral? There is no answer to this question, because the existence itself of Cinecittà is not something we could discuss in terms of ethics and morality. Cinecittà is an instrument and as such it can be good or bad from the point of view of its capacity to serve the purpose it has been created

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<sup>3</sup> An exception is made by Constantin Salavastru, mainly in his paper “Rationalité et manipulation: les sophismes dans le discours politique”, in *Cahiers de psychologie politique*, No. 1, January 2002, at the address

<http://lodel.irevues.inist.fr/cahierspsychologiepolitique/index.php?id=1656>.

The Romanian scholar sets his discussion on a good basis, evoking definitions from authoritative authors.

for, which is making films. It does, so it is good. Was it good in the fascist era of Benito Mussolini? Yes, because they could make films there. If we move to the moral aspect of film production, then we will see that in the late 30s and the early 40s the aim they were using Cinecità for was not good. But, as we can see, is another discussion.

#### **4. Possible counterargument to the position above**

They say that manipulation is bad, always bad, because it is a way to deprive the other of their freedom of choice. It's true that, in a strict and narrow politically correct approach, allowing people to make free options in any situation is the supreme value of a democratic society. But, as a character from a crime series said, for some people, sometimes the truth shouldn't prevail as necessary, the conservation of the innocence should. In fact, one should refine the approach, one should nuance the view over such things. As proved in the example above, parents cannot (and should not) let complete freedom of choice to their children, for the simple reason that little ones are not really equipped to know good from bad in any type of situation. The little ones are not the only persons whom a well balanced individual should refuse the absolute, total freedom of choice. Psychologists have discovered that a teenager can develop, within a period of 24 hours, the symptoms of all known mental diseases; the doctors know that sometimes an ill individual can express poor reason and miscalculate their own state, which make them difficult to cooperate with in order to get them cured; uninformed and/or uneducated people frequently make bad choices regarding their own lives or even the lives of many other people, which can lead to disastrous results for the entire community. These are just a few examples of situations where we should think twice before letting everybody, anybody make entirely free choices at all times.

#### **5. Freedom of opinion vs. manipulation**

Taking all the above as a starting point, let us try to have a rough look over some of those institutions of the modern world which we can call "mind formatting institutions". Some of the most known could be: the family, the school, the church, the press. Their role in a given society is to make individuals cope with the establishment, to become "good citizens", whatever this might be. Reproaches like "why can you not be like everybody else?", exhortations like "follow the good models in your life"

(where not everybody agrees exactly on which are the “good” ones and indeed less are they telling you why it is that those are the good ones in comparison with other models you could feel more attracted to), all these formulas are but wooden language saying nothing else but the fact that one should fit into the community they live in, one should make choices (or just fake making choices) according to a line, an already traced line. And then there can be the surplus of information some people pour over the head of the others, which can lead to changes in the behavior of the recipients (if they keep talking about this, it has to be important!). The apparent freedom of choice parents give to their children, teachers give to their students etc. is nothing more than a choice between what is socially acceptable and what is not. No third way open, no place for innovating, for a “good child”. It is just good or bad, moral or immoral and the youngster is urged to choose the first option.

**The family** is the first institution the individuals live in. Restrained or large, the family is the first circle where children learn how to act properly in different kinds of situations they might be confronted with during their lives. Culturally, these “appropriate” approaches are different, as communities’ requirements are not alike and the families are set to prepare their offspring for a life in their respective community. Do families build up in children a tendency to always really make free choices? Certainly not! Are they asking openly and explicitly their children to do whatever those little ones should do? Sometimes, only. Other times, parents, grandparents, uncles and alike just manipulate the children in order to have them act in the most appropriate way. Why? See the answer in the paragraph above! Instead of direct, incentive discourses, grown ups use emotional pressure or fake reasoning to determine their children to act in accordance with what the neighbor society is expecting from its members. Promises of what Santa Claus will put under the Christmas tree mixed with menaces of scarcity of the gifts from Santa for the “bad” children, descriptions of the gloomy future as rational consequence of bad behavior are but different ways of manipulating children into making them choose the “right” behavior. Is it good? Is it bad? It certainly is depriving them of free choice in their actions, but the aim is worth doing so: they will cope with the society and this is what every parent wants for their children.

**The school.** Families also prepare their young ones to do well in school. Now, let us have a look at what happens during the school years. There is always a plan teachers have to observe, and there are perspectives they have to go along with in their teaching. Think of the

discipline called “history”. It should be about *the* History. We all know that it is just a subjective presentation of it, in order to manipulate the youngsters, to make them be proud of their nation, to admire certain figures (as possible models), to get a specific perception of the world. Cavanna, a French humoristic author, observes in one of his books that the British have a peculiar habit of naming streets, places, squares by the name of defeats, while the French act normally and they name their streets, places, squares by the name of victories. It is all about perspective! Then, we can think of Science: who was the first one to formulate the law of conservation of mass? Was it Lomonosov or Lavoisier? If your school is in France, then..., while if it is in Russia, then... Now, what are children singing in music classes and what paintings are they studying in drawing classes? To know this, one should know where a particular school is located. There is more: American children are not that much encouraged to learn foreign languages, because everybody speaks American English all over the world (or they think they do!); on the other hand, children from countries like Romania are urged to get good command of foreign languages in order to prepare themselves for interacting with people from around the world. It is not without an obvious explanation that some languages are better liked than others and thus better known: knowing English, for example, means that one could get fat grants for studying in numerous rich countries all over the world, while knowing French (which takes considerable bigger effort to learn than English) opens sensibly less opportunities from this point of view. Offering more practical advantages is a way to manipulate young people, a way to force choices, and it takes place in schools, and it is officially recognized, and they call it educating young people.

**The church** – and we will refer only to the Christian Church, as we feel we can understand much better what it is and how it works – is a very important institution in the life of the communities where Christ's religion is the religion of the majority. Christ's church is involved in the moral education of individuals and in the enhancement of the cohesion of the community. Aside from the Ten Commandments, priests' discourse is manipulatory: choosing the right parabola to end the Sunday service is an art the pastor of the congregation has to perform in order to suggest solutions for the actual problems of the community. Rhetorics? Pragmatics? Both, coming from the text of the Bible itself and from the actual performance of the priest in front of the believers. Manipulation? Yes, of course! Is it bad? All we could comment should be on the



efficiency of the storytelling in the church. The aim is moral, God wouldn't allow it otherwise, so...

**The press** happens to be part of our life more than other institutions, because it functions everyday, all day long, for a long period of time of anybody's life, longer than the influence of the family, of the school, of the church. One simply cannot stay anchored in the reality one lives in without the information coming through the press. Let us first consider the mechanism that makes the press be such a powerful institution. Defined in its strict essence, the press is made of people specialized in acquiring and editing news content and special machines which multiply that content in many copies and distribute those copies simultaneously to a lot of people who are the public of the respective media product. The force of the media comes from that simultaneity of the distribution, together with the conscience any member of the public has of the fact that they receive the exact same content in the exact same moment as a very large number of other individuals, so they will know the same things at the same time. It is very powerful, mainly because of the conscience of participating in the same events simultaneously!

But we should have a look over the hardship of journalists' work, too. It's hard enough to try to be where the important things happen, it's hard enough to compare what you know with what you see in order to determine whether you are in the presence of news, it's hard enough to mould in the appropriate form the content in order to pass to the mind and the soul of the specific public of your journalistic product. But the harder thing is to make choices in the infinite amount of information breaking unstoppably over them. Journalists act as gate keepers serving the public interest. Journalists serve the public interest, but who can really define the public interest at any moment?! Journalists have to decide in a fraction of a second whether some information should be passed over to the public or not. Sometimes they are right, sometimes they aren't. These are the risks of the profession. At any rate, the public is served with products coming from somebody else's choice. Manipulation? Sometimes, yes! It happens when the journalists undertake the role of conscience guides, and the choices they make might be maculated by this very decision of theirs. This can go further when the journalists use those techniques called "agenda setting" and "framing", consisting of framing<sup>4</sup> issues or subjects

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<sup>4</sup> In order to understand what *framing* means, we could apply to clarifications Joseph Schillinger (1948) makes in his *The mathematical basis of the arts* (New York: Philosophical Library), chapter 7, Ratio and rationalization (p. 193 ssq.): "*Rational behavior* – behavior according to a ratio. *Rational composition* – composition based on a

and/or priming the public towards some perception of the reality. If the journalists' only intent is to awake the members of the community to some issue the latter tend to ignore but which is of real importance for all, then we can say that the manipulation through agenda setting was towards a good, moral aim. Otherwise, it's bad, but the discussion should concern another matter: it should go around the efficiency of the journalists' action, and this could help in deciding whether that manipulation was a good instrument or not. The moral problem lies in the distance between journalists' agenda and the public agenda: if that distance tends to zero, we may have manipulation, but the aim is perfectly moral. What we shall discuss is the efficiency of the manipulating media discourse: it will be considered good manipulation if the intention behind the discourse was fulfilled. It's all about the capacity to perform, not about the moral nature of the aim pursued in some manipulatory action.

We had a look at some mind formatting institutions, of some techniques they use, of some purposes they pursue (in a not so transparent way!) and all we can say is that all of the above are just normal, everyday situations and routine actions. In most situations, we have manipulation, meaning that kind of influence the target is not aware of.

Summing up, manipulation is a specific type of discursive influence, which counts as a tool. As such, it cannot be judged in terms of moral vs. immoral, it can only be judged as fit for the purpose or not. In other words, instruments are to be evaluated only from the point of view of their capacity to perform the activity they have been chosen for. If they perform efficiently, they are good. If they do not perform efficiently, they are bad. So, manipulation being an instrument, a tool, it can be good or bad. But we should make no mistake here: the discussion is not about morals!

By this, we intend to do for manipulation the same kind of justice Perelman and the neo-rhetoric did half a century ago for the Rhetoric: Rhetoric came to be no longer seen through Aristotle's lens, as bad, because it was used only to dissimulate one's thoughts, to conceal the truth, but the art of making efficient discourses. Ethically, the change was quite important, from lying to performing, from telling lies to the truth

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ratio. *Rational thinking* – thinking in terms of ratios. When the ratio is established, involution (power-differentiation) takes its course. Cutting a portion of space by simple (monomial) or complex (polynomial) periodic motion establishes an area. Thus, enclosing an unbounded space in a rational boundary *ipso facto* introduces regulations that are the inherent laws within the boundary. The act of limiting converts potentiality into a tendency (intent).

well told. In the same way, manipulation stops being just bad (ethically, morally) and it begins to be evaluated in terms of efficiency (good or bad in achieving the action it has been called to do).

## 6. A time for everything

There has to be a time for freedom of choice, and a time for manipulation, simply because telling the truth is not always the best option<sup>5</sup>.

All the discussions above make us think of discursive argumentation, whose only aim is the efficiency of the discourse. It is not about the truth, it is not about ensuring the other perfect freedom of choice. It is all about performativity, hence we could look over the examples and discussions above from another perspective, let's say from the one proposed by the theories developed by Charles Morris, mainly the discourse typology created by the American. The first of his ideas coming to mind is the one concerning primary *vs.* secondary usage of discourses.

Content analysis can be used to illustrate the advantage one could have in preferring secondary usage of discourses over primary usage. In the 40's of the last century, it has been empirically proven that the interlocutor's behaviour is influenced by the aim of the discourse (or intention pursued in the discursive activity and by the dominant features of the signification of ascriptors, if we are to use the terminology of Charles Morris). In the table below, we can see how the modes of signifying are not dependent of the phrase structure in the same way the modes of signifying are determined by the grammar or by the linguistics of the phrase.

One should not take the findings represented in this table as rules, but as what had been noticed in empirical observations which were made starting from the well known typology of discourses proposed by Charles Morris, where specific types of discourses can be found at the intersection point between some mode of signifying with some mode of usage. In his construction, Morris points out primary usages (the usage of a discourse is made in direct accordance with its mode of signifying) and secondary usages (where the usage of the discourse has no direct relation with its mode of signifying). The theory already had led to the conclusion that secondary usages were more efficient than the primary ones, and all that researchers had to do was the practical verification of the theory. Here it is, in the table:

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<sup>5</sup> See also Joe Haines. 2011. "The right to know is not absolute". *British Journalism Review* 3: 27-32.

Aim of the discourse	Type of discourse usually expected (inefficient, thus not recommended)	Type of discourse recommended (efficient)
Evaluation	Appreciative (as mode of signifying)	Designative (seems to be objective – as in fiction)
Injunction	Prescriptive (as mode of signifying)	Appreciative (which is perceived as less insistent, thus more persuasive, as in the moral discourse)
Information	Designative	Prescriptive (less theoretical, thus more convincing, like in the technological discourse)

So, Morris said – and he proved it in experimental work – that secondary usage of discourses is more efficient than the primary one. Thus, to inform better, one should use some other type of discourse than the designative, while to incite people one should avoid the prescriptive type of discourses and use any other type from the remaining three proposed in his scheme, etc. By describing some object with accumulation of details, one could make that object desirable, wanted by the hearer, more than if the speaker would just say “love it!” or “take it!”, “buy it”. Maybe this is the reason why the Ten Commandments don’t work as well as an appropriate story can work, if well told at the end of the religious service, the homily. Instead of the imperative formulas, the priest uses the technique of analogy, inviting the followers to find the truth and the solution to their problems by themselves, the same way the people in the Holy Land had found them all those many years ago, by paying attention to what the Lord was telling. The effect is stronger, it marks the spirits and it stays there. The designative mode of signifying of the discourse in the homily proves to be more powerful than exhortations of any kind, even those coming from God!

The agenda setting as a tool used by the press works in the same way: repeating enough some idea will place it among the priorities in the spirit of the public, while telling them abruptly that the idea in question has to be accepted as a priority might produce the exact opposite reaction.

In situations like those that occur in the classroom, for example, making an appreciative discourse about some object or person, will make that person or object be perceived as a model to follow, so the teacher wouldn’t have to go exhorting the pupils by saying “do the way the model does!”, “keep your belongings in the state the model pupil does!”. The

pupils would simply want to get the same appreciations like the model and for this to happen they will take the evaluation for an exhortation. The performative force of the discourse would be much bigger.

Now, it is time to have a look over another manipulation technique. If we look into texts where changing the primary usage of a discourse is manipulating the receiver (see, for example, Alina Căprioară's position<sup>6</sup>), then the conclusion could be that in order to be efficient one should manipulate, and if we accept the general idea that manipulating people is wrong, the conclusion seems to be that one has to choose to be inefficient in their discursive activity because of ethic compelling laws (thus, moral principles).

## 7. So, ...

... the observations above should make us go back to the main discussion proposed by the present paper: is manipulation – as such – a bad thing? Or, to place it in another perspective: can we discuss manipulation – as such – in terms of morality? Once again, it seems to us that we cannot accept this discussion, because its own foundation is wrong: we cannot discuss an instrument in terms of good vs. bad from the moral point of view. All we could do is to discuss that instrument as good vs. bad in terms of adequacy and efficiency: if it can serve the purpose it has been chosen for, then it is good. If it cannot serve well enough that purpose, then it is bad.

We could speculate on this and propose a model with four types of manipulation that could be found at the intersection points of efficiency and morality. This could give something like what we can see in the table below:

<b>Efficiency</b> <b>Morality</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Bad</b>
<b>Good</b>	++	+ -
<b>Bad</b>	- +	- -

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Alina Căprioară. 2009. *Discursul jurnalistic și manipularea*. Iași : Institutul European.

A big, sharp knife, when used by the skilled cook who is Jamie Oliver, is efficient because it helps the gifted young chef to carry out lots of activities converging to excellent dishes; the same kind of knife is also good, when used by a murderer, in his action of killing some inhabitant from Midsomer, because the poor victim doesn't stand a chance. What are we discussing here? Efficiency, of course! Can we talk morality? Yes, of course, but we will be discussing the aims the manipulation is used to and the results of our analysis won't be the same: cooking is morally good, because it leads to culinary pleasures and a healthy life, so the first usage will be considered good from the moral point of view; killing people is wrong, morally, so the second usage is not good.

The speculation above is what its name says it is, but it could serve in further studies as a means of classification.

The instrument remains the same, and it is amoral. It can be good or bad, but only from the point of view of its capacity to help in performing a particular activity. The aim one uses an instrument for can also be good or bad, but this time the discussion is on morality.

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