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**La forme logique et la possibilité de la représentation.
Réévaluations de la théorie de la vérité dans le *Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus***

**The Logical Form and the Possibility of Representation.
Reassessments of Theory of Truth from *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus***

Abstract: Among epistemologists, the theory of truth constructed by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is one of the most successful versions of the correspondence theory of truth; the reason is that the *Tractatus* theory proposes a convincing analysis of the correspondence relation. The intention of this investigation is to re-evaluate this theory from *Tractatus* by re-examining and reinterpreting the idea of the state of facts. Starting from some Wittgensteinian fragments, I will try to argue that the facts cannot be understood as fragments of the external world, but rather as representations with a lower degree of generality and abstraction than that of propositions. Wittgenstein does not construct in *Tractatus* an epistemic theory of truth, but only sets out the semantic conditions a proposition must fulfil in order to receive the attribute of “true”. Moreover, by completing his semantics with an ersatz world, the philosopher departs considerably from the real world, from the world described by the sciences of nature. In this context, the epistemic value of a proposition called «true» becomes irrelevant.

Keywords: truth, correspondence theory of truth, state of facts, ersatz world, logical form, correspondence relation, picture theory of representation, possibility of representation.