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ESENȚA PROBLEMATOLOGICULUI: PROBLEMA FILOSOFICĂ

Abstract: It seems to us natural to use the word “problem” in the vocabulary describing philosophy. We are usually told that philosophy deals with problems, that philosophy has its own problems or that philosopher means problematizing. Regardless the way these statements are further elaborated, they already contain an assumption of legitimacy in making substantial use the word “problem”. But what is the base for stating that philosophy deals with problems? Asking ourselves about the justification of the discourse relating to the philosophical problems, we try to avoid the more direct questions which are usually asked: “Are there philosophical questions?” or: “What are the philosophical questions?” or: “Which is the nature of the philosophical questions?”. Such direct questions are not unjustified but they pre-determine us to understand philosophical problems as “spiritual entities” whose “essence” or “nature”, we should identify. That is why refuting a “substantial” or “naturalistic” vision on the problems, we consider that we have to focus on the discourse regarding problems and research upon its grounds. Within this study, by the grounds of a discourse we mean what makes it possible or what supports its validity claims. More precisely, we will try to show that the discourse regarding problems represents a way of problematizing in itself and that its underlying assumptions pre-determine the problems interpretation. The intention of our study is to identify and evaluate the paradigms of thought on philosophical problems. Despite their variety, the discourses on philosophical problems seem to be modeled mostly on another type of speech – mainly related to scientific problems. This analogy has as result the negative characterization of the philosophical problems as “insoluble” “repetitive”, “senseless” and even “pseudo-problems”. The assumption that the philosophical problems must be conceived and evaluated based on the paradigm of scientific problems is derived from a model of thinking which may be named positivist, scientist or resolute. Such a way of thinking may be found in various speeches on philosophical problems among which some are antiphilosophical, and others, on the contrary, pro-philosophical; but, as they belong to the same resolute paradigm of problematizing, they ignore the specificity of philosophical problems. Opposite to this way of thinking we analyze in our work the essay of the French philosopher Michel Meyer who proposes a problematological vision on philosophical problems. Problematology, defined as “the study of questioning”, proposes two important distinctions with reference to problem structure and problem stating: on one hand, the distinction between the “apocritical answer” and the “problematological answer” and, on the other hand, the distinction between “solving through solution finding” and “solving by expressing the problem”. With these distinctions Meyer argues that expressing problems through problematological answers is more specific to the philosophical problems than solving them through apocritical answers. This reevaluation – through a new way of thinking – would allow explaining that in philosophy the problems are not disappearing, but always thought over, the plural answers indicating the relevance of problem stating as the aim of philosophical speech. Meyer argues that this perspective change is possible by-passing the so-called “propositional model of rationality”, which ignores the importance of questioning and which would be characteristic to the entire philosophical tradition, in an interrogative model of rationality which is proposed by problematology. Analyzing the

proposal of Meyer, we will show that the distinctions are questionable and rely basically on the same comparison with the scientific problems which is also recognized in the resolute paradigm of assessing philosophical problems. The contrasts proposed by Meyer between science, as a process in which the “questions disappear and the answers accumulate” and philosophy, which restates the problems in a problematological manner through answers – can not be supported within the research in the present epistemology. This research highlights the role of problem stating in the structure and dynamics of science and the role of “problem genealogy” in the identity of sciences. On the other hand, neither in philosophy, the persistence of problems does not indicate their “repetition”, because, according to the context, the significance of problems changes by accumulating also “knowledge” on the tradition of philosophical problem stating. Such a tradition of “history of problems” remains incomprehensible outside the “problem of history” which is in fact the origin of philosophical problem stating. Meyer’s problematology lacks this dimension which is, for instance, involved by Collingwood who shows how the “logic of question and answer” is applied in understanding historical events. The openness towards such a perspective looks to us a way to bypass the cognitive models (such as problematology) of understanding philosophical problems.