Book reviews

Comptes-rendus
Bruno Leclercq, *Introduction à la philosophie analytique. La logique comme méthode*  
(Editions De Boeck, Bruxelles, 2008)

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What we call today with a generic term "analytical philosophy" contains in itself, both as issues and as name, a disconcerting diversity of thinkers – with enough differences between them – and even a greater diversity of themes and approaches, some that seem to no longer have any connection with the hard core of the doctrine as it was set in programmatic documents, few in number, which have shaped it. Paradoxically perhaps- although within the space of philosophical thought nothing can be seen as a paradox, analytic philosophy has emerged on the continent, but developed with a significantly greater force in the North-American area, that today many of those who are not aware of the origins, talk about the phenomenon as one of American origin! What is truly important, however, beyond the discussion on priorities, remains the attraction exerted by such exercises of thought and understanding of "what is." What is behind this situation? It's difficult to say exactly, but some approximations can be expressed, of course. First: analytic philosophy has always aimed to the essence of philosophical meditation, yet recovered in the first thoughts stated by Aristotle in *Metaphysics*: "What is 'what is'?". Unlike many other trends that are, from the beginning, sectoral approach. Let us recall Quine's famous quotation: "To be is to be the value of a related variable!" Second: analytic philosophy undertakes in order to give an answer to the first interrogation I mentioned, a clear and rational acceptable methodological tool for all those who consider rationality the fundamental way of knowledge: *logical analysis*. We retrieve it implicitly at Frege and Russell, we retrieve it explicitly at Carnap and Quine. And, not infrequently, its results are downright surprising. Other directions do not explicitly set out the methodological approach, as pure reflection is the implicit contact follow that leads to the answer. But a pure reflection is not a method! Third: analytic philosophy theorizes, on the edge of the prime interrogation that I mentioned, an issue of great impact, yet present at Plato in *Cratylos* dialogue: the relationship between the sign and the world. What lies beyond the signs we use to convey knowledge to others? A world, of course, in a general meaning of the word, but a world that is possible. When is it possible? When you meet the criteria of rational consistency, Kripke draws our attention.

The reflections above were induced to us by contact with a new work on analytic philosophy¹. Its author is a young logician and philosopher at the University of Liege, Bruno Leclercq, Paul Gochet’s successor from the same university department, who was the author’s master in understanding the analytical philosophical approach, as we read in the introductory page of the book. The work we present is, as its title announces, an "introduction" in the issues of analytic philosophy. Therefore, we are not dealing with a "phenomenology" of the philosophical thought of this kind, nor a

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structural analysis of it, but, rather, the scoring of key moments in the birth and development of this type of thinking, the order criterion being the authors that originate analytical thinking or those who have contributed substantially to its final establishment within the quite colorful concert of contemporary philosophy. Do not get our hopes down, however, because often modest steps with limited announced intentions have contributed more and with greater benefit to the development of critical reflection and updating of themes that have become of great interest!

First name taken into consideration: Gottlob Frege. The fundamental text that is of interest and, indeed, is almost always invoked as a basis in the analysis of crucial issues of analytic philosophy, namely the significance, is Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892), although several observations presented here will be resumed by the cited author in other writings also. Bruno Leclercq discusses on some key issues for Frege's impact on the problems of analytic philosophy. The first of them: conceptual writing ("Begriffsschrift"). Frege argues for the implementation of the leibnizian ideal of universal language (universalis feature), and this action program is reflected in the conceptual writing which constitutes its "ideographic" axiomatic system, with the aim to express by a precise manner, suitable for a logic calculus, the concepts and the relations between them, which traditional logic has assumed more intuitive. Let's face it, if the idea is the most relevant, if the utterance of logical expressions is one of the most suitable and accurate, the assumption of this language, inspired more by geometrics, was one of the factors that have contributed to the "inadherence" of Frege's system towards specialized audience and its rediscovery as a founder rather late in the fields that propelled him. Second: logicism. Frege is the first to explicitly and programmatically announce that logic must be the solid foundation of mathematics, not vice versa (as suggested, for example, Boole by trying to have an algebraic approach over logic). With this explicit assumption in its approach and emphasized by Russell who suggested that the fundamental goal of Principia Mathematica is to show that "mathematics is derived from the principles defined in terms of logic" and by Hilbert (in Axiomatisches Denken, 1918), Frege is at the core of the foundationist program, very courted in a certain period of research development in mathematical logic. Third: the distinction between meaning and significance. In Über Sinn und Bedeutung, this distinction reveals three levels: proper names level (basic concepts), assertive sentence level and phrase level. Here we find the idea of great productivity for modern logical calculus, according to which the meaning of elementary propositions is the truth value. The distinction in question is present for the functional analysis expressions in Funktion und Begriffe study (1891).

Second name: Bertrand Russell. No doubt, Russell's creative personality is more complex. He is the author (together with A.N. Whitehead) of an axiomatic system of maximum completeness that impresses with its harmony, its depth and interpretative openings, leading to be considered the "classic system of modern logic". For the spectrum of analytic philosophy, certain topics from Russell are of interest and are summarized in a productive manner by Bruno Leclercq. A matter of great impact for the development of researches into the analytical philosophy is related to Bertrand Russell's position on referentiality. It is expressed in the clearest and direct manner in the classic study on denotation (On Denoting, Mind, 1905), resumed in later works and permanently nuanced and which build what the exegesis on the theory of logical

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semantics will call the theory of definite descriptions. The most interesting point here is the answer to the question: "How denote the phrases that refer to fictional objects?". Or, more serious expressed: How the expression that doesn’t denote are denoting?". Russell’s thought in this matter, as some of his illustrations (the famous example "Scott is the author of Waverley") are already passing as common places into classic research area (Kripke, Quine, Strawson). Bruno Leclercq insists, and well done given the didactic intent of his work, on the illustrative explanation of some of Russell's concepts, on the correspondence between the theory of definite descriptions and other attempts (especially Frege), but also on the origins of this conception, with Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects holding an important role. A second Russell's idea which has risen major debates in analytic philosophy is the issue of self-referentiality. What happens to our expressed thought when it refers to itself? Obviously, it conflicts! We find here, approached from a modern logic perspective, the logical-mathematical antinomies theme, but being still deeply rooted in antiquity, from the Cretan Epimenides. The origins of the theory of self-referentiality at Russell lies in his research on propositional functions. The author notes that there are situations where a propositional function has as an argument ...the function itself! For example, the "class of all classes that do not contain themselves as elements" is an illustration of the previous statement. It generates antithetic consequences: if it contains itself means that it is not contained (as defined in the class setting), if not contained means that it should contain (under the same definition)! What to do? To determine a hierarchy of the language that we use to express our thoughts, Russell says. How? Through a so-called theory of types of logical objects: one should not use to express the logical objects, the objects language itself, but something else. We distinguish, therefore, some types of language: the language of objects ("man"), the language of characteristics of objects ("man is clever"), the language of characteristics of the characteristics of objects ("man is really intelligent") and so on. Lest we fall into the paradox, we must come up with restrictions on the language we use: there’s no need to talk about objects in the language of objects, the properties of objects in the language of properties and so on. But the restriction is indeed one solving the problem?

Can not miss from this synthetic investigation of analytical philosophy, the name of the man who generated directions and the most diverse research in the context of this philosophical school of thought: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Even if there are also to be taken into account other writings of the noted philosopher, two still remain fundamental to shaping the outlines of his thinking and the references that were established: Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical Investigations (1953). The first issue of the Tractatus: the isomorphism thinking-language-world. It might be discovered if we follow the conceptual order of Wittgenstein’s deduction: the fact is the substance of the world (1.13), it is known simply as a picture (2.1), which is a model of reality (2.12), and

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3 Maybe it is interesting to point out that this "theory of object" proposed by Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) was lost on the road for a long time. Even the criticism of Russell On Denoting failed to propel Meinong to the attention of research. Recovery was made later, thanks to the rediscovery of his conception by the spirit of Anglo-Saxon researches (J.N.Findley, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, Oxford University Press, 1963.). It may be also recalled the International Conference held in Graz (September 30 to October 4, 1970), its papers were published under a title that aptly captures the entire concept of Meinong: "Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein" ("Beyond the existence and nonexistence"). Cf. Encyclopædie Philosophique Universelle, III, Les œuvres philosophiques, PUF, Paris, 1992, p. 2674-2676.
the logical picture of the world is thinking (3), which has as an essential element the sentence, whereby thinking is expressed perceptual-sensory (3.1), and the assembly of propositions constitutes the language (4001). There isn’t a clear determination of the three instances of the world’s construction and its knowledge so as to ensure that situation in which everything works accordingly to its own role and for this reason some failures manifest clearly: "language disguises the thought. Thus, by the shape of the outer robe one can not conclude about the disguised form of thought, because the outward form of the vestment is completely designed for purposes other than to allow the body shape recognition "(4002). Hence, the difficulties of understanding come out from the fact that language is not able to clarify our thoughts. This task recurs, as to Wittgenstein, to philosophy. The second issue of equal importance concerns the so-called logical atomism of the Tractatus, outlined probably under the influence of Frege and Russell’s research on the role of proposition in logical calculus. For Wittgenstein, the elementary proposition is a prime, indecomposable element of logical thinking. Any complex thought that we put in motion is nothing but a combinatorial truth function of elementary propositions that compound it. This logical atomism opens the way for some, at least interesting, references of our thoughts (embodied in sentences) to the world. Possible worlds of an elementary proposition are its possibilities of truth (the capacity of the sentence to be true or false). A combination of two elementary sentences actually generates four possibilities of truth. Two of the sixteen combinations of two elementary propositions have a special standing in relation to the world: one that is always false and one is always true. They say nothing about reality and are not, therefore, a picture of it: first because it shows us that no state of affairs is possible, the second because it shows us that any state of affairs is possible! These propositions do not make sense in Wittgenstein’s terms. What did we say about reality by saying that: "It is raining or not raining"? Nothing, of course. The statement is tautological. A third issue is constituent to Philosophical Investigations: the concept of a language game. A concept that has made a career, which came in use even in ordinary language starts from a relatively simple idea, accessible to common sense: ordinary language, despite its imperfections, is an appropriate way to represent reality and the diversity of ways that our language uses for reality is a support for the language-game concept. We have here another Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein II), who begins a rigorous counter-argument "against the author of Tractatus", as if it were someone else! If Tractatus argued the need for a perfect language to clarify our thoughts, and the basis of this ideal language was the idea of proposition’s very-functionality, Investigations point out that, conversely, an ideal language wouldn’t be of much use in trying to clarify the representation force of our thoughts, rather ordinary language analysis could help us in this regard. From here, a full analysis of the possibilities of expression of everyday language, which will subsequently become even a line of research integrated into analytical philosophy (Austin, for example).

Rudolf Carnap’s name is unavoidable in the analysis of analytical philosophy. This is because the German philosopher, stated member of the Vienna Circle, focused his attention especially on the issues of semantic logic and less on the syntax, as did Frege or Russell, authors of own axiomatic constructions. First, Carnap proposes a conceptual clarification of scientific discourse (in Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928), based on the idea that the great problems facing science in its rational becoming are determined by the fact that rather many concepts have entered its field without a thorough and critical examination of their meaning and significance, so that, when used,
they generates both difficulty in understanding and conceptual consistency. As Bruno Leclercq stressed, the aim of carnapian analytical approach is to "clarify" the conceptual dower of theoretical discourses from different fields of knowledge, to achieve a "uniform ordering of concepts, allowing a finer understanding of the issue involved by each individual problem and the approach of a solution" (1: 146). In line with this idea, the author proposes his own method of clarifying the science and philosophy concepts, namely logical analysis. Each concept, emphasizes Carnap, for example, in Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache (1932), must satisfy certain criteria of significance. If they meet the criteria, then it may be placed without restraint in categorical core of science, otherwise not. Carnap believes that in science, maybe more in exact sciences, some concepts can accurately determine their meaning, by answering to the method criteria and by reference to their contingent concepts. The deeper problem, from this point of view, is going on in philosophy, specifically in the field of language philosophy: fundamental concepts of various philosophical discourses do not respond, even by far, to these requirements. Carnap catalogued them without any restraint, as pseudo-concepts, with no meaning, and metaphysics is merely a mediocre expression of life feeling! Carnap's whole constructive efforts will focus on identifying the most effective ways of clarifying the concepts of science, or even how to build them. So are things happening in Die logische Syntax der Sprache (1934), where, influenced by the works of Hilbert, Gödel and Tarski, Carnap tries to "capture", in an explanatory proposal, "the rationality of mathematics" by analyzing how formal axiomatic-deductive systems work. He is, moreover, the author of that famous phrase "in logic, moral sense does not exist" (found in the work mentioned above), which suggests the arbitrariness and conventionalism of the axiomatic construction, one significant criticism against such constructions. A full expression of his concerns for conceptual clarification is the work Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (1947), where concepts like "state description", "logic concepts", "domain" are the joint points for a proper method of determining the meaning and significance of different logical and linguistic constructions: the method of intention and extension.

Trying to trace the outlines of Willard Van Orman Quine's contribution to the development of analytical philosophy, Bruno Leclercq insists upon the influence of Rudolf Carnap on American philosopher and logician, recalling Quine's European layout from 1932-1933 where he meets the most representative names of logical positivism (Moritz Schlick in Vienna, Alfred Tarski in Warsaw, Rudolf Carnap in Prague), and – perhaps more significant for the destiny of his work – that "Quine's research joins almost in its entirety to a dialogue with the one of his master, whether it is a direct development – particularly the assumptions about the ontological commitments – or, on the contrary, it denounces and rejects some central assumptions of Carnap's doctrine – including Russell's conception of classes as abstract entities, the logicism from Platonists, the presupposition of the existence of semantic entities as meanings or propositions, the distinction between analytic and synthetic, the founding project based on logical atomism "(1: 197). Even in this small passage, we notice the main themes that will populate for more than forty years Quine's research and will be subjects of his writings. Quine's work has been established, Bruno Leclercq says, as a "critique" of certain ideas of logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and, interestingly, his later works are nothing, for the most part, other than the "development and radicalization of the findings of his youth "(1: 197). That does not seem to be unique to the great thinkers, and we run the risk to say that Heidegger was just developing later, themes and ideas from Sein und Zeit.
(1927), a youthful work of the philosopher! Some of Quine's ideas are outlined in this introduction. First: **ontological commitment**. It is, as we said, the only element of continuity with Carnap. Quine formulates for the first time in a conference at the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science (Vienna, 1939), his famous "criterion of ontological commitment": any science is founded by the assumption of the existence of entities which are values of linked variables. A scientific discourse if talking about something, then that something must exist! This principle will generate the well-known Quine's **nominalism**: any name should express an object and this will be the source of his famous definition of existence: "to be means to be the value of a variable." Second: **logical assumption moderation**. Frege and Russell have said directly that the foundations of mathematics should be sought in logic. Quine is, in this regard, more temperate: a "conceptualist" assumption is that mathematical entities are rather discovered than built by our minds and these would be more reasonable for understanding the fundamentals of these sciences. Mathematical formalism, so actual in axiomatic systems, does not have many things in common, after Quine, with what we are trying to find behind our language signs: significance! Third: **the analysis of the idea of intentionally context** is an attempt to further mitigate the full recognition of some semantic entities as meanings and propositions. The idea of "referential opacity" refers to the recognition of a negativity of intentionally contexts: identities that we want to establish are not, in fact, authentic identities, because they do not support a *veritate save* process of substitution! Fourth: the enunciation of his famous thesis of **indeterminacy of translation**, linked, of course, to the referential opacity of intentionally contexts. Due to the fact that we can not determine the exact meaning of a word and that, moreover, it is almost impossible to determine the synonymy of terms we use, it is impossible to determine an act of translation. In this explanatory context, there are known the examples which Quine uses to show what happens to a grammarian and lexicographer when facing a language unknown with the aim to establish the meaning of terms. Fifth: **criticism of analyticity and rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction**. This criticism is reflected in *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* (1951) and also Quine resumed it with further opportunities. Quine states that the classical Kantian analytic-synthetic distinction does not stand up at comprehensive analysis of its bases. Quine's objection arises from the distinction between **meaning and reference**. Analyticity is a matter of meaning (analytic statements are those that can be alethic determined by analyzing the meaning and not by reporting the facts, thus by invoking the reference). But if the reference objects are more easily identified, the problem is more difficult in what regards the meanings. Let's listen to Quine in *Two Dogmas ...*: "Concerning the theory of meaning an outstanding problem is the nature of its objects: what sort of things are meanings?". This interrogation, let's face it, is devastating for one who thinks he knows something about meanings! On explanatory and illustrative alignments, Quine points out that analyticity is unsustainable because: definition is ineffective, as identification procedure, to underlie something like this; synonymy is unable to underlie the *salva veritate* substitutability, even construction of artificial languages that propose "semantic rules" for determining the analyticity of an utterance, can not satisfactorily resolve the thorny issue of analyticity because it does nothing but to change from assuming without explanation the term "analytic" to assuming without explanation the term "semantic rule"!

Of course, an introduction to issues of analytic philosophy felt some negativity without reference to what was called with a generic title, "ordinary language philosophy". Suggested by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, but fully
anticipated by George Edward Moore, in *Principia Ethica* (1903), this direction will be continued by the premier philosophers of the Anglo-Saxon area, as Gilbert Ryle, John Langshaw Austin, who will outline what later will be called "Oxford school". What these thinkers have in common – like others who have their starting point in the research of the previous – take the assumption that analysis of ordinary language can be an inexhaustible and important source for understanding the things that our concepts cover. Obviously, this main assumption is externalized differently by thinkers invoked. In Moore, this treaty called *Principia Ethica* aims to investigate "ethical reasoning", in which ethical propositions have a fundamental role, the predictable result of Moore being a "meta-ethic" construction to serve as a framework of analysis for any future ethics, even a philosophical method aimed at the whole approach. Ryle is concerned with denouncing artificial language formulations (targeting directly to Russell) which have no connection to objects, with things that are made to signify and to get closer to the analysis of "usage" of our ordinary language forms. Austin goes further in this regard and, in one of his works, published posthumously, *How to do things with words* (1962), which covers the philosopher conferences held at Harvard in 1955, traces the outline of the *speech-acts theory* and proposes a distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances, which emphasizes the practical-operational functions of use (usage) our established expressions.

The work that we comment on has some obvious merits. It is characterized by clarity and precision in exposing the ideas and concepts that are, for the general public, almost impenetrable. To introduce the latter into the subtleties – for many useless – of analytic philosophy is a proof of courage that not many assume, on the grounds that they have something better to do! The young logician from the University of Liège concedes to such effort. Moreover, he eludes elegantly a bias present among the scholars: that if you expose your ideas in a abstruse language, often precious, you are implicitly more deep into what you are saying! Nothing more false! On the other hand, one can notice from the development of this introduction the endeavour of the analyst with the text of the investigated author, his struggle to recover – among the diverse and multiple expressions of an idea or another – what is relevant, important in a philosophical view, in order to have a coherence of thought towards the one who leans on the text. Let's face it, philosophical concepts, especially the ones that matters in the economy of philosophical thought, are not revealing the essence and the structure to the first-comer, so it is necessary to toil on the text to get the important things out of it.
Book reviews

Mark Batey, *Brand Meaning*  
(Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008)

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The meaning of ‘meaning’ is perhaps one of the most complex themes for authors who try to build comprehensive theories of human communication. Apart from being a fascinating puzzle which many philosophers of language have been trying to solve, it is one of the central issues any practitioner should have in mind before setting off in the domain of public communication. Any specialist in this field should ask himself a few basic questions about the dynamics of meaning-creation in the public sphere. How do people endow sentences, things and institutions with meaning? What criteria do they have in mind when judging the relevance of a particular public message sent to them? How susceptible to change are the existing meanings in the stakeholders’ minds?

Commercial rhetorics raises even more questions in its attempt to create persuasive messages that shape a meaningful brand image in the public’s mind. How do brands get their significance in people’s lives? What is the connection between the private and the public meaning of a brand? What holds together brand communities? How can it be that certain brands become cultural icons and others do not even reach the status of a ‘trustmark’, although similar advertising budgets were invested in their promotional campaigns? What influences the meaning-transfer between a commercial and a brand’s representation in the public’s mind?

These questions and others are discussed in Mark Batey’s book which takes an interdisciplinary approach on branding - understood as a multidimensional process of signification. The author defines brands as clusters of meanings existing in consumers’ minds and analyzes the dynamics of these mental representations. He puts together relevant pieces of information from the fields of semiotics, cognitive and analytical psychology, sociology and economics to provide a comprehensive view on the social games people play with brands. A common thread which is detectable throughout the book is the focus on the *negotiation of meaning* that takes place explicitly or implicitly between brand managers and the key-publics of a particular brand.

The first chapter lays out the origins of branding as means of identification. Bricks in Ancient Egypt and cattle in the United States were given differentiating signs to avoid conflicts between their owners. In Europe, branding was used as a signaling system to avoid imitation and inferior quality. Although much has changed, these basic functions are still at the core of the branding process today. Creating trust between a brand and its stakeholders and differentiating a brand against its competition continue to be the main purposes of brand communication.

From the outset the author approaches the issue of brand representations in neuropsychological terms, introducing the notion of *brand engram*, which is the associative neural network representing the brand in the mind. The author suggests a few key-topics which will be recurrent in one form or another throughout the book. One of them is that brand representations are dynamic networks of meanings which are influenced by all the encounters one has with a brand. Therefore, all *touchpoints* between a brand and a consumer must be aligned to stand for the same core-values and
to embody the same brand personality. Another implication of this neuropsychological approach on brand meaning is that it makes clear the active role of consumers in interpreting commercial messages. Cultural background, personal values and group affinities create the implicit premises that influence any inference drawn by the consumer from an advertisement. This core idea is detailed in the following three chapters.

The second chapter focuses on human needs and values in order to provide a proper background against which one could legitimately ask the question ‘What kinds of functions do brands perform in people’s lives?’. The ideas of Freud, Maslow, Rokeach, Schwartz and Gutman are briefly discussed in order to introduce the reader to the larger picture in which brands fit in and to indicate some of the perspectives from which brand meaning could be understood in its complexity. The research method of *laddering* is explained in this chapter. It is presented as a technique that aims to identify connections between product attributes and higher-order values which the consumer hopes to attain. The author also discusses the relevance of the archetypal theory in a marketing context. Although his analysis of brands that instantiate archetypal figures seems really compelling, it fails to demonstrate any causal relationship between a brand’s archetypal potential and its appeal to the public.

In the third chapter, the author continues to provide insights which support his thesis that brand meaning is not the result of passive reception but of construction and interpretation. He shows how brand meaning can be enriched if the sensory properties of a brand are trademarked and become part of the associative networks existing in the consumer’s mind.

The investigation started in chapter two about the way people endow material possessions with meaning is taken a few steps further as the fourth chapter develops. The author now brings forth some of the most effective methods for the measurement of brand meaning. He discusses how specialists could use semantic differential scales to uncover some of the key-associations of particular brands in consumers’ minds and to understand what sets a brand apart from its main competitors from the public’s point of view. The author suggests that the dimensions of brand meaning can only be accurately identified by analyzing the different orders of signification on which a brand operates simultaneously. It is this multidimensional structure of brand meaning that the author tries to deconstruct in the next chapter, which contains the original contribution he makes to branding theory: the *Brand Meaning Framework*.

In the fifth chapter, the author explains why verbal responses of consumers are not enough to uncover the full spectrum of brand meaning. Most of the answers consumers give in a marketing survey are the result of rationalization, offering only a partial picture of how the brand is represented in their minds. Actually, brand associations include not just verbal descriptors of a brand, but also sensorial cues and emotional connotation. The author introduces the term *Implicit Brand Meaning* to describe the psychic resonance a brand has in its consumers’ mind, which is unconscious or preconscious and therefore more difficult to access by classical marketing research techniques. Batey militates against superficial one-word generic definitions of brand meaning and explains why it is essential for specialists to go beyond the tip of the ‘symbolic iceberg’ when exploring consumers’ mental image of a brand. He exemplifies beautifully how many facets a notion like independence can have for consumers (p.129). Although the author’s account of how neuroscience findings apply to branding theory is equally engaging and scientifically-founded, there are a few argumentative leaps in this
chapter. One of them concerns the presumed applications of the somatic marker theory to branding. Despite being itself a controversial hypothesis, somatic marking is claimed to be a way to ‘favourably dispose consumers to a brand on an instinctive level’ (p. 116).

The author brings no proof of such ‘instinctive’ dispositions consumers might have towards particular brands. Apart from this, when talking about neuromarketing, Batey presents it as a chance “to access consumers’ thoughts directly and objectively” (p.143). Still, most readers with basic notions of neuroscience and fMRI techniques would be skeptical about such a courageous claim. Monitoring which parts of the brain become activated when exposed to different stimuli is far from being the same as the magical endeavour of reading consumers’ thoughts.

The following two chapters provide useful guidelines for those involved in high-level brand management. The author turns to brand extensions and explains why it is important to measure and understand the dimensions of brand meaning in the publics’ eye before taking any strategic steps in brand portfolio management. The public should be able to perceive consistency between the meaning of a particular brand and the significance of its extensions. Batey introduces the concept of consumption constellation, which is a cluster of complementary products with similar functional or symbolic meanings in the consumers’ mind. By seeing brand extensions and joint promotions from the perspective of these consumption patterns, marketers would be able to provide solutions which would answer consumers’ need for order and consistency.

Another important suggestion for specialists is that the dynamics of brand evolution can be decoupled from the product life-cycle as it is traditionally understood in marketing theory. The brand evolution model (p. 204) provides an alternative framework for brand managers. It explains why brands which become icons are no longer attached to narrowly-defined product categories and become meaningful symbols within a (sub)culture.

The meaning transfer between advertising messages and brand image is the central topic of the last chapter. The author emphasizes the importance of keeping a coherent brand-concept throughout all means of brand communication. As brands are seen more and more as part of the entertainment market and advertising often employs complex narratives and sophisticated rhetorical figures, one can easily forget that the main focus of a commercial has to be the brand-message. It often happens for a commercial to be remembered by millions who are fascinated by the story but can tell nothing about the brand being promoted. Engaging advertising is not a purpose per se, but only a means to an end. Batey points out that marketers should shift their attention from advertising the brand to branding the advertising. Recognizable characters, a particular visual style, brand properties are some of the methods he suggests to strengthen the associative network in the consumers’ mind between the brand and its advertising campaign (pp. 212-216). The author also insists on the role of brand consistency across all touchpoints a brand has with its consumers, including those provided by the new media (pp. 220-222).

The book manages to create a clear and comprehensive picture of how brands exist in our minds and to what extent these representations can be enriched or modified by commercial communication. Its constant emphasis on the contextual relevance of brands is in itself a valuable insight for both specialists and lay audiences interested in the complex phenomenon of brand signification.

A clear shortcoming of the book is that it focuses solely on product brands, leaving out interesting topics such as institution or nation branding. By deriving the
meaning of brands from the meaning of material possessions in our lives, the author provides a rather narrow approach on what brands may come to represent in the public’s eye. Branding principles were successfully put to work by international museums such as Tate, not-for-profit organisations such as the National Housing Federation in Great Britain and by many countries, Spain and the Bahamas being two of the exemplary cases. Without a doubt the author should have discussed the interesting questions raised by these experiences if the book were to measure up to its title.
François Jost, *Comprendre la télévision et ses programmes*  
(2e édition, Armand Colin, Paris, 2009)

Andreea ŞTILIUC

François Jost est professeur à l’Université Paris 3 Sorbonne Nouvelle. Il est aussi directeur du Centre d’Études sur les Images et les Sons Médiatiques (CEISME) et de « Télévision », la première revue francophone entièrement consacrée à l’huitième art. Il a participé à de nombreuses conférences universitaires et colloques partout dans le monde. Sémionologue, spécialiste de l’image, il est considéré l’un des meilleurs analystes des médias de l’espace francophone. Au début, il a écrit plusieurs ouvrages sur le cinéma : *Nouveau cinéma, nouvelle sémiologie* (avec Dominique Chateau) ; *L’Œil-caméra. Entre film et roman* ; *Le Récit cinématographique* (avec André Gaudreault) ; *Un Monde à notre image, Enonciation, Cinéma, Télévision*, etc. Ensuite, il s’est dédié à l’étude de la télévision : *Penser la télévision* (avec Jérôme Bourdon) ; *Introduction à l’analyse de la télévision* ; *La télévision du quotidien. Entre réalité et fiction* ; *L’Empire du loint* ; *Années 70 : la télévision en jeu* ; *Le Culte du banal* ; *Le Téléprésident. Essai sur un pouvoir médiatique* (avec Denis Muzet) ; *Grandeur et misères de la télé réalité* ; 50 *Fiches pour comprendre les médias* (auteur et direction de l’ouvrage collectif) ; *Les Médias et nous*. Beaucoup de ses ouvrages (articles ou livres) ont été traduits en espagnol, portugais, anglais, italien, japonais, russe ou chinois.


Plutôt que de condamner la télévision, cet ouvrage met au jour les logiques qui conduisent à proposer telle émission à telle heure, et le téléspectateur à la suivre. Si les réponses sont à chercher dans de multiples directions, toutes ramènent aux programmes. »

Cette nouvelle édition prolonge l’analyse de la fabrique des grilles de programmes par une réflexion sur les bouleversements en cours à l’heure de la TNT, de la nouvelle télévision publique et, bientôt, de la télévision mobile. À tous ceux qui, convaincus de l’importance de ce média, veulent comprendre ses enjeux et ses évolutions, ce livre apporte des outils indispensables. »

*Comprendre la télévision et ses programmes* est un livre qui s’adresse aux étudiants, aux universitaires, mais aussi à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à la télévision, ouvrant différents rapports et niveaux de compréhension que le lecteur peut avoir avec l’œuvre.
Le livre est structuré en huit chapitres. L’auteur parle des obstacles à l’analyse de la télévision, donne des réponses à la question : Qu’est-ce que la télévision ?, analyse le genre, le ton des émissions et les mondes auxquels renvoie la télévision (réel, fictif, ludique). Il introduit des notions connues plutôt par les professionnels et les analystes que par le public : télévision de l’offre, télévision formatée, format, audience, part d’audience, programmation verticale, programmation horizontale, identité des chaînes, etc. Les chapitres 5, 6, 7 décrivent en détail les trois mondes (réel, fictif, ludique). Dans le dernier chapitre, on nous propose une analyse proprement dite d’un programme, tenant compte des étapes, des erreurs à éviter, du choix du meilleur angle et du corpus.

On apprécie la clarté et la rigueur dans la structure de ce livre. Les chapitres s’enchaînent logiquement, l’auteur envoie aux chapitres suivants, où il va traiter un problème en détail, ou il rappelle au lecteur qu’il a déjà parlé en profondeur d’une certaine question dans un chapitre précédent. On pourrait dire que cette manière entrelacée est un peu inspirée de la logique médiatique actuelle, dominée par les interconnexions typiques à l’Internet ou la promotion des programmes par les chaînes elles-mêmes, dans des bandes-annonces.

Pour illustrer ses propos, Jost donne beaucoup d’exemples du paysage audiovisuel français, mais en les rapportant à l’industrie médiatique globale, en les mettant en cotexte universel. Il s’arrête aussi à des exemples comme les événements du 11 septembre, le faux charnier de Timișoara ou Loft Story, la version française de Big Brother, etc. De cette manière, il ne s’adresse pas seulement aux lecteurs qui sont familiarisés avec l’espace francophone. Une preuve dans ce sens est la récente traduction de ce livre en portugais - Compreender a televisão (traduction par Elizabeth Bastos Duarte, Maria Lília Dias de Castro et Vanessa Curvello ; publication par Editora Sulina, Porto Alegre, Brésil, 2010).

On ne va pas faire ici une description détaillée des idées présentées dans ce livre, en invitant le lecteur de le savourer à une première vue. On va parler, quand même, d’une problématique et d’une vision sur l’analyse de la télévision et des médias en général, qui forment le monde, l’originalité de François Jost et qui transparent de ce livre, aussi.

Pour François Jost, comprendre la télévision, ce n’est pas seulement « enquêter dans le milieu professionnel pour apprendre comment on fait une émission », « dépouiller les archives écrites des chaînes, étudier le système des lois et des textes qui régulent la vie des chaînes », « démonter les mécanismes économiques » ou « s’en tenir, plus simplement, à l’étude des programmes ». Pour lui, l’idéal de la compréhension devrait être « tout cela à la fois » et encore plus.

Un programme de télévision obéit à différentes règles : « obligations de la chaîne par rapport à son Cahier des charges, nature de la chaîne (publique ou privée), place de l’émission dans la grille et, bien sûr, définition des critères de ce qu’on entend par qualité. » (p. 7). Les programmes peuvent être groupés en genres, ce qui nous permet de les intégrer dans une collection d’émissions « dotées de propriétés comparables ». (p. 39) Comme on l’a déjà mentionné, pour François Jost, les genres se rattachent à trois mondes: réel, fictif et ludique.

« Au pour de vrai de l’information, qui prend le monde comme référent, au pour le faux de la fiction, qui vise un univers mental, il faut donc ajouter un pour de rire, dans lequel la médiation se prend pour objet, qu’il s’agisse de jouer avec le langage (énonciation), de jouer avec le jeu (aléa) ou de faire de l’art pour l’art. » (p. 44).
Une autre notion analysée par Jost, qui est assez ignorée par les chercheurs, est le *ton*, qu’il ne faut pas confondre avec *monde*. Si un journal télévisé est présenté d’une manière plus légère, parfois amusante, cela ne signifie pas qu’il renvoie plutôt au monde ludique qu’au monde réel. L’auteur souligne le fait que le genre répond aussi « à des intérêts juridiques ou économiques ». (p. 46) Les chaînes sont autorisées à émettre à partir d’un Cahier de charges, établies par le Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel. Elles sont obligées de diffuser un certain nombre de fictions produites en France ou des émissions culturelles, etc. Pour certains programmes, les chaînes peuvent recevoir des aides à la production, ce qui fait que, parfois, les émissions soient incluses dans des catégories auxquelles elles n’appartiennent pas, afin de profiter du financement. Le genre est « une interface entre les producteurs, les diffuseurs et les téléspectateurs, via les médiateurs que sont les journalistes. […], le genre accomplit deux sortes de promesses ». (p. 48) Il s’agit d’une *promesse ontologique* (la comédie est une promesse de rire, le direct est une promesse d’authenticité, la fiction « est la promesse d’un monde arrangé en fonction d’une cohérence d’ensemble. ») et d’une *promesse pragmatique*, qui tient aux stratégies de marketing.

La notion de *promesse* a été introduite par François Jost dans l’article *La promesse des genres*, paru dans le numéro 81 de la revue *Réseaux*, en 1997. Jost se détache de l’approche qui conçoit la communication médiatique comme un contrat. Il considère que la promesse est un acte unilatéral, qui engendre des attentes au récepteur, pas des obligations.

Dans le *monde* jostien, le premier geste de l’analyse télévisuelle consiste dans la déconstruction de la promesse de la chaîne et le rattachement à un genre. Ensuite, il faut mettre le programme en contexte, étudier les collections et pas les émissions isolées, percevoir le programme par rapport à la chaîne qui la diffuse et en fonction de sa place dans la grille. En plus, on doit faire un bon usage du corpus et pas se laisser submerger par les archives.

Un aspect très utile de ce livre est le fait que l’auteur ne se contente pas de nous donner seulement des notions théoriques, mais il fait une analyse réelle et complexe, à partir de la grille qu’il propose. Il s’arrête à un format d’émission qui a une grande résonance à travers le monde. Il s’agit de la version française de *Big Brother, Loft Story*. Jost souligne l’habileté des producteurs de promouvoir le programme sur trois pistes à la fois, pour fédérer le public et obtenir une audience plus grande.

On s’arrête ici avec notre courte incursion dans l’univers jostien, en vous invitant de lire ce livre, mais aussi les autres ouvrages de François Jost et, pourquoi pas, consulter le blog [http://comprendrelatele.blog.lemonde.fr/](http://comprendrelatele.blog.lemonde.fr/), afin de découvrir son *monde*. C’est une *promesse* de qualité.
The hardcover edition of Cicero’s *Topica*, published in 2010 by “Al. I. Cuza” University Press, is a first in many ways. It is the first translation of this Latin treatise into Romanian, the first bilingual edition of Cicero to appear in Romania, and the first volume in a new series dedicated to rhetoric (a series duly called “Cicero,” coordinated by Constantin Sălăvăstru).

The volume contains an Introduction, “Cicero and the Subtlety of Discovering Arguments” (pp. 7-37), a preliminary note about the Ciceronian text (pp. 39-43), the *tabula siglorum* (p. 45), a brief note about the edition (pp. 47-48), the bilingual text (Latin-Romanian) of *Topica* (pp. 50-109), a section with explanatory notes and commentaries (pp. 110-118), an index of Greek words (p. 119), a Latin index of technical terms (pp. 121-123), and an index of proper names (p.125). Aside from the Introduction, written by Constantin Sălăvăstru, and the Latin text of *Topica*, all of the sections are the work of Traian Diaconescu.

The Introduction is divided into six sections. It lists the themes of Cicero’s *Topica* (pp. 7-15), compares and contrasts Cicero and Aristotle (pp. 15-20), and discusses the relevance of Cicero’s *Topica* to neo-rhetoric (pp. 20-26). The place of *Topica* in Ciceronian theories of “rhetoric” (pp. 26-30) is important for any discussion about Cicero and the tendencies of contemporary rhetoric (pp. 31-35), revealing the “usefulness” of Cicero’s writing in today’s world (pp. 35-37). The Introduction provides Romanian readers with important information for understanding the technical treatise of *Topica*, insisting, as one can see, on the relevance of the ancient doctrine of rhetoric to modern readers. One can recognize, in this vein, a useful strategy for the legitimization of ancient knowledge in a culture such as Romania, still largely ignorant about classical learning. From another perspective, the question concerning the relevance of ancient knowledge and rhetoric to modern readers is legitimate, as long as the rhetorical performance is no longer “unmediated,” as it had been in Antiquity: new forms of rhetoric, made possible through modern, “democratic” media, have led to the development of a more remote, anonymous audience, listeners and readers who now have a less immediate and tangible relationship with the orator.

The next two notes, signed by the translator, describe the difficulties of translating a technical text on rhetoric into Romanian. The reasons are many: only a few of Cicero’s works have been translated into Romanian, and these few translations are not part of a systematic enterprise. Therefore, it is understandable that the present translation would be affected by such circumstances. It should be noted that the critical printed edition is Henri Bornecque’s edition (1924). One can assume that the option for a copyright-free edition could be justified; unfortunately, the recent critical editions of Cicero’ *Topica* have not been exploited.

The translation is generally reliable, although a few passages have been mistranslated (see p. 65, with the definition of heritage; p. 81, with the three types of conditionals of “dialectici” and, a few lines below, the examples given for the conclusions from *contraria*; on p. 91 the translation is hampered by some inversions).
The main problem in the translation is in the conflation of Latin technical terms: the translator himself acknowledges the difficulties surrounding this (see pp. 39, 47, 110). For example, the Latin word “adfectae” is translated both as “close to” (in Romanian, “apropriate,” p. 55) and as “connected to” (“într-un fel de legătură,” p. 57). The Latin “adiuncta” is translated as “analogy” (“analogie,” passim in translation); but surprisingly, in his preliminary note about the Ciceronian text, the translator seems to have given “adiuncta” a better translation, defining it as “connected notions” (“noțiuni vecine,” p. 40). The technical term “prroprium” is understood as a “peculiar characteristic” (“caracteristică particulară,” p. 65), and “habitus” is seen as “behavior” (“comportament,” p. 85). The Latin “differentia” is frequently translated as “distinctive aspects” (“trăsături distinctive,” p. 67). Finally, the classical “res publica” is translated first as “state” (“stat,” p. 97), then as “public affairs” (“treburi publice,” p. 99), and then on the next page of the translation as “republic” (“republică,” p. 101).

As one can see, for the translator, the most difficult technical terms are the philosophical ones. In fact, the problem is rooted in one basic difficulty: the errant, unstable technical terminology of ancient philosophy in Romanian. Regrettably, only a few ancient philosophical treatises have been translated into Romanian (there is only one periphrastic translation of Aristotle’s Organon; and his Rhetoric was translated for the first time only a few years ago, with a similar neglect of technical terms). So it is still difficult to find the most appropriate means of translating the technical terms used by Cicero in such a technical treatise as Topica.

The final sections of the edition contain notes and commentaries intending to clarify the translation. The explanatory texts are useful, mainly concerning realia. Again, it is obvious that the translator used a restricted, French bibliography (see p. 47, where three editions of Topica from the nineteenth century are mentioned).

The indices serve as very useful tools for the reader. Surprisingly, there is no separate section for the bibliography. There are relatively few misprints in the volume (though the Latin text and the spelling of certain Greek words could be improved in subsequent editions of the book).

In conclusion, the bilingual edition of Cicero’s Topica, offered by Constantin Sălăvăstru and Traian Diaconescu, represents an important step on the long road to the recovery of Classical Antiquity in Romania. The contributors hope that Topica will be the first in a longer series that will encompass all of the (rhetorical) works of Cicero. Indeed, half of this work has already been done; as the ancient proverb goes, the beginning is already half of any activity.
Laurence Bouquiaux, Bruno Leclercq,  
*Logique formelle et argumentation*  
(De Boeck Université, 2009, Bruxelles, 2009)  

Viorel ȚUȚUI

In the last two centuries logic has become one of the most complex and dynamic scientific fields. The axiomatic method permitted the scientists in this field to extend the scope of the logical research far beyond its traditional domain. Logic is no longer a unique science, but a very complex system of sciences. Moreover, there are new and formal ways of interpreting and systemising the long lasting contributions developed in the course of the history of logic. This is the reason why the task of offering a unique handbook that synthesises some of the most important developments, not only in formal logic, but also in the theory of argumentation and rhetoric, has become a very difficult one. But this is precisely the objective of the recent work of Laurence Bouquiaux and Bruno Leclercq, *Logique formelle et argumentation: compléments pédagogiques en ligne*.

Their book is not only a very useful introduction in logic and in the theory of argumentation, but an authentic and unitary research of the general problem of distinguishing the correct way of reasoning from the incorrect one. In the view of Bouquiaux and Leclercq, this is a problem that everyone faces if they are interested in “transmitting information by the means of a rational discourse” (p. 5).

The book is structured in two parts, one dedicated to logic and the other dedicated to the theory of argumentation, which are closely related by the common objective of analysing the different criteria for distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning. As the title suggests, their approach of this matter is a pedagogical one. They offer more than 250 examples of reasoning to illustrate all the theoretical subjects and 330 exercises (for which they provided all the answers), with the aim of offering the reader the opportunity to apply the knowledge that he acquired.

The first part is named “Déduction” and it contains two chapters, one for each domain of the classical logic: the sentential (propositional) logic and the first order predicate logic. The first chapter, “Logique des propositions”, starts with the definitions of some of the most important logical concepts: deductive validity, formalisation, logical form. Their introduction, concerning the sentential logic, follows not only systematically, but also diachronically the evolution of this field. They present in a chronological order the main contributions, starting with the ancient logic of the megarics and stoics, which introduced the concept of a propositional inference and the difference between hypothetical, disjunctive and conjunctive inferences. Bouquiaux and Leclercq continue with the presentation of the truth-functional interpretation of the logical connectives that was developed by Gottlob Frege, of the formalisation process and of the contemporary methods for testing the validity of propositional inferences: the truth tables, the semantic tableaux, equivalence and normal forms transformations, natural deduction and the axiomatic definition of the logical connectives.

The second chapter, “Logique des prédicats du premier ordre”, has the same structure, beginning with the notion of predication. They continue with the presentation of the ancient and medieval contributions concerning categorical propositions, the
relationships between them (from the square of opposition) and other types of immediate
and mediate inferences, the conversion and the obversion, the syllogism and the
traditional methods for verifying the validity of the syllogism: the Venn diagrams and
the Boolean algebra. Regarding the contemporary predicate logic, they mention other
important concepts of this logical domain like logical quantifiers, propositional functions
and relations, formalization, and other important methods for testing the validity of the
inferences: the semantic tableaux, equivalence and normal forms transformations,
natural deduction and the axiomatic definition of the logical quantifiers.

In the second part of the book, named "Argumentation", their research of the
problem of distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning goes beyond the subject of
formal deductive validity to the problem of analysing different constrains on the
rationality of argumentation. This part contains two chapters: one dedicated to the theory
of fallacious arguments and the other to the theory of rhetorical argumentation.

From the very start of the first chapter, "Théorie des sophisms", the two authors
of the book mention the fact that in the history of logic many different logicians and
philosophers have developed different classifications of the fallacies, none of them being
completely satisfying. So, they offer their own classification, one that is inspired by that
of Aristotle and contains six types of fallacies, each type representing the violation of
one of the following rational constrains:

(a) The constraint of deductive validity.
(b) The constraint of non-deductive rationality.
(c) The constraint of the univocity of language.
(d) The constraint of conformity between the conclusion that was proved and
the conclusion that was announced.
(e) The constraint of the explaining and of the critical analysis of the premises.
(f) The constraint of the rational pertinence of the argument in relation with
the conclusion.

In the first category of fallacies they include: affirming the consequent, denying
the antecedent, affirming a disjunct, violating the laws of De Morgan, confusing the
contradiction and contrariety, violating the laws of distribution of the quantifiers,
reversing the order of the quantifiers. The second class contains the cases of abusive
applying of the inductive principles, of the principles of cause identifying, of the laws
concerning the relation between parties and wholes, and of the principles of practical
rationality. Regarding the third class, they mention the cases of lexical, syntactical and
referential ambiguity, of the wrong accent and of the style figures. In the fourth category
they include: ignoratio elenchi, straw man argument and ad ignorantiam. Concerning
the fifth class of fallacies they enumerate: begging the question, complex question, false
dilemma, reversing the burden of proof, authority, ad fidel, ad populum, ad
antiquitatem and different cases of ad hominem arguments. The last category contains:
ad passiones populi, ad consequentiam, ad baculum, ad carotam and ad misericordiam.
In the final part of this chapter they rightfully underline the fact that in the practice of
argumentation these fallacies usually take very subtle forms. So, very often it is difficult
to decide if an argument is correct or fallacious if we consider only the general form of
the argument without taking into account the context of argumentation.

In the second chapter, named "Dialectique" they analyse the difference between
correct and incorrect reasoning in the context of everyday argumentation. This chapter
contains three sections. In the first one, named "Le débat contradictoire", Bouquiaux and
Leclercq present the features of this kind of argumentation, the personalisation and the
non-necessary character, using the example of the juridical argumentation. In the next section they use the contribution of the new rhetoric developed by Chaîm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in the book *La nouvelle rhétorique*, which consists in a typology of convincing argumentative strategies. Bouquiaux and Leclercq present the way in which this model can help us to redefine notions like: deductive validity, non-deductive rationality, univocity, conformity between the conclusion that was proved and the conclusion that was announced, critical analysis of the premises and rational pertinence of the argument.

In the final part of their book, the authors of *Logique formelle et argumentation*, present the contribution of Frank Van Eemeren and Rob Grotendorst, from the book *La nouvelle dialectique*, in which they developed the pragma-dialectical theory. According to this theory the interventions of the parties in an argumentative dispute must be understood as a dialogue by which they try to solve their conflict. From the perspective of this theory the fallacies can be interpreted as pragma-dialectically illegitimate strategies: violations of the ten rules of a correct argumentative dispute (p. 194).

We can conclude that in the two parts of the work we analysed, Bouquiaux and Leclercq present two different ways of distinguishing correct arguments from the incorrect ones: a formal, logical way governed by the constraints of a justification that is necessary an impersonal, and a informal, argumentative and rhetorical way based on a different kind of constrains that govern the rational argumentation in the language of everyday life. So, they offer not only a useful handbook containing the most important subjects in the fields of sentential and first order predicate logic, theory of argumentation and rhetoric, but manage to provide a perspective of these problems that transcends the differences between these various ways of studying the process of human reasoning.
Barbara Warnick, *Rhetoric online – persuasion and politics on the world wide web*  
(Peter Lang Editions, New York, 2008)  

Georgiana ALEXANDRESCU

Barbara Warnick, head of the Communications Department of the University of Pittsburgh, is one of the „pioneer” researchers of the „new rhetoric” in the American environment. Manifesting a vivid interest for what is called „the apparition of the online means of persuasion”, the author attempts to investigate the manner in which the traditional methods, belonging to classical rhetoric, are continuously adapting to the online environment, thus generating a completely different approach.

Edited 6 years after *Critical literacy – technology, rhetoric and the public interest* (2002), *Rhetoric online* focuses on elements that were previously analysed, this time adding a political point of view.

As the title suggests, this book represents a successful endeavour of sketching and inventoring the new rhetorical techniques employed in the online field, mainly during some American electoral campaigns. Despite its publishing in 2008 (and thus its rather low degree of actuality), the book visibly concentrates an effort almost unique in the field of political discourse online. The five chapters of the rather brief material (approx. 150 pages) create a parallel between the antique triptych of „ethos, pathos and logos” – as it is portrayed in the traditional rhetoric – and the forms it embodies today. Since the discourse in the old habermasian political sphere has unquestionably moved on the „world wide web”, the metamorphosis of the old means of persuasion becomes inevitable.

Barthes’s distinction between „work/opus” (seen as a unitary whole, „accompli”, „achevé”) and „text” (as a piece of perpetual, unfinished, prone to correction work) marks an important stage in the first part of the book; what we find related to this is a set of „key features” of the”new medium” that are being highlighted: manevrability, interactivity and the focus on the reader/user instead of on the author. However, Warnick’s text does not make a boastful pleading in the honour of the electronic means of communication. Its whole charm comes from the realistic underlining of the major drawbacks using such a medium can entail. Instability, volatility, secevntiality, asincronicity and discrimination (on grounds of an unequal access to internet nowadays) are but a few of the limits. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the message, the difficulty in identifying a precise source, the doubtful credibility are other disadvantages to going online.

During the same first part of the book, Warnick warns of the substantial altering of the role of communication factors as we used to know them. If the literary text /the classical communication evolves gradually (the message being successively transmitted from transmitter to receiver), the online opus depicts a receiver/reader that can always take on the role of transmitter/author and that can even modify the intention of the originating text. Signification is, therefore, co-created, by means of a reciprocal negotiation process that ultimately generates a perpetually provisional text.

If, in traditional rhetoric, the „ethos” made the difference between a credible and a less credible source, today interest originates in the form and the graphics of the
message rather than in the markers of credibility. Questions such as „Who is the author?”, „Which qualities make him eligible as speaker in a certain domain?” are, little by little, substituted by interrogations such as „How useful do I find the message?” Or „Do I like the form that the message takes?”. In case the answer to these last two questions is negative, a more suitable alternative will immediately be searched for on a more attractive, more accessible website.

The surveys that the author quotes show that, generally, users have the obvious tendency to look, at first, at the degree of usefulness of the information discovered, and, then, to the way in which information is presented – graphic design, accessibility, „the degree of proximity”; the way in which content is literally exposed is only at the bottom of users’ list of priorities.

What also needs to be mentioned when talking about the virtual medium is customization; otherwise said, once the reader interested in medical or technical issues enters a website, he is immediately assaulted by throngs of banners, photographs, commercials that match his geographical characteristics, as well as his web search parameters. It can be said, thus, that intertextuality (as an appeal to a predefined, preexistent set of notions) – as a main rhetorical figure – realises the connection between the author and the text, just as Perelman and Tyteca anticipated when tackling the issue of knowing one’s audience.

The second part of the book – chapters 3, 4 and 5 - brings forward a couple of case studies that are meant to back the theoretical part; at the same time, this second part clearly demonstrates how the virtual online approach can be entirely benefic to an electoral campaign. By looking at websites such as www.indymedia.org (independent media center, edited by people around the world), the author states that the old criteria used for assessing the legitimacy of the website are nowadays inappropriate; the above-mentioned website, enjoying unrestrained permission for posting content, sums up about 10 million visitors each day. In spite of its low standards in writing, texts on the website are read and commented daily by thousands of people that sympathise with the promoted values: freedom of speech and of act, independence, solidarity etc.

In order to exemplify the concept of „interactivity” in the equation of the online media, the author turns to some major electoral campaigns in the recent history of the United States (Bush, Kerry, Cheney, Dean). Anticipating what Barrack Obama’s more recent campaign generated in terms of financial outcome, the websites quoted are the living proof that a professional, attentively designed website can gain the candidate some 60 million dollars campaign money throughout exclusive online donations (Kerry, the 2004 campaign). Of course, Warnick warns, some basic criteria must be encountered regarding interactivity; this has to be „user-to-user”, „site/campaign-to-user” or „user-to-onthewebsitedocuments” respectively. Otherwise, results can prove modest.

The last chapter of Rhetoric online tackles the issue of intertextuality and stresses upon the importance of its understanding whenever the author wishes to empathize with his reader. By referring to Barthes, Kristeva and Bakhtin, Warnick shows how ignoring this side of the (both classic and online) text can have fatal consequences in reception, by estranging the reader from the original intention of the creator. The text is seen as a „network of potential and real meanings”, as an allegory generating an „orientative”, a „presentational” or an „organizational” meaning. Otherwise said, decoding the text is only made possible by some preexisting instruments that every conscience owns; every newly-met pattern is being associated with familiar elements that make the understanding possible.
Extremely systematically edited, both theoretical and practical, Barbara Warnick’s text can be considered a handbook useful to communication professionals, as well as to researchers willing to go deeper into the study of online rhetoric. Whether talking about support websites used in electoral campaigns, about collective media websites or about reactionary websites making use of parody, the appeal to intertextuality or to interactivity is a constant one. Apparently, this would be a major change in relation to traditional rhetoric. In fact, what we are dealing with is only a reconsideration of the same methods from a new perspective – that of a form in perpetual construction.
Au fil des années, la recherche de la manipulation a été abordée sous plusieurs perspectives – sémiotique, rhétorique, appartenant à la théorie de la communication – les significations attribuées à ce terme étant marquées par une transition de la perception actionnelle, manuelle vers ce genre d’opération intellectuelle qui vise à changer l’univers épistémique du public. Herman Parret construit une image historico-évolutive des connotations de la manipulation (Parret, 1978: 2-3). Ainsi, il passe en revue cinq étapes: la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle qui considère la manipulation comme une méthode pratique, utilisée par l’industrie minière et grâce à laquelle on pouvait extraire l’or et l’argent; la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle qui utilise, afin de définir cette notion, une signification appartenant à la chimie ou à l’industrie pharmaceutique; le XIXe siècle qui attribue à ce concept la signification de mouvement manuel subordonné à une opération scientifique ou technologique et ensuite celle d’acte intellectuel, comme par exemple dans des expressions telles « manipuler les questions », « la pensée manipule les idées », etc. L’année 1864 connaît l’apparition du sens péjoratif de la manipulation, considérée comme action qui vise à décevoir, à tromper ou bien à persuader le public d’accepter certaines idées sans même s’en rendre compte (cette dernière acception a donné naissance à des expressions telles « la manipulation électorale » ou « la manipulation politique »).

Les emplois manipulateurs du langage sont sérieusement pris en considération, « la manipulation linguistique » désignant l’utilisation consciente du langage d’une manière déviate afin de contrôler les autres, où « utiliser le langage d’une manière déviate (using language in a devious way) signifie utiliser le langage d’une manière qui cache certaines de ses stratégies et objectives » (Fairclough, 1994: 2360). En tenant compte du fait que, régulièrement, l’instrument de la manipulation est le langage et sa capacité de dissimulation ou de déguisement de ses réelles intentions, le message manipulateur sera construit en rapport avec deux objectifs: identifier les types de résistance possibles afin de les déconstruire et cacher la totalité de la démarche manipulatrice. L’École de Palo Alto, en ayant recours au concept de « réintégration », démontre le fait que, afin de changer un comportement, il faut, en principe, modifier le système qui détermine sa manifestation. Il faut donc construire un autre sens pour illustrer la même situation; en s’appuyant sur les concepts dérivés de la théorie de la communication ainsi que sur sa perception en tant que transmission d’informations mais aussi en tant que création de nouvelles significations, Alex Muchielli équivaldra les notions d’action d’influencer, manipulation et persuasion de telle façon qu’« influencer signifie donc donner naissance, à l’aide des manipulations contextuelles ad hoc, à un sens imposé aux interlocuteurs et qui les détermine à réagir en conséquence. Bien évidemment, le manipulateur a déjà prévu ce sens de telle façon que l’action qui lui correspond soit en accord avec ce qu’il envisage » (Muchielli, 2002: 36-37).

La problématique avancée par le concept de manipulation est, par conséquent, très complexe, très vaste et très discutée. En général, l’analyse de la manipulation se fait en s’appuyant sur des relations complexes avec d’autres termes extrêmement généraux et
importants, comme par exemple, *argumentation, persuasion, conviction, mensonge, stratagème communicationnelle, rhétorique*, etc. Tout comme Philippe Breton le remarquait, les situations d’argumentation pures ou les situations de manipulation pures sont extrêmement rares et cette réalité, à part le fait de créer un possible amalgame théorique, demande un traitement spécifique et vigilant (Breton, 2001). La manipulation, un acte essentiellement dissimulé, ne s’autopré sente pas en totalité mais cherche à convaincre, à tout prix, non pas par l’intermédiaire de la pertinence factuelle du contenu ou par la justesse des schémas logiques utilisés, comme dans le cas de l’argumentation. Si la persuasion (Sălăvăstru, 2003: 302), en tant que performance discursive qui découle d’une bonne argumentation, a un effet discursif positif, la manipulation de l’interlocuteur résultant de la violation des lois logiques et de la communication d’informations non conformes à la réalité représente une des maladies discursives actuelles, notamment, tout comme Lionel Bellenger le soulignait, en raison du fait que les distinctions sont, le plus souvent, assez difficiles à faire: « la persuasion n’est que le revirement produit par l’influence qu’on peut avoir sur les autres. Par cette qualité, elle se rapproche de la rhétorique, n’est pas loin de la séduction et, fondamentalement, elle entretient avec la manipulation un rapport ambigu » (Bellenger, 1992: 3). De même façon, si l’on pense à la manipulation et au mensonge et à leur capacité de produire des ruptures discursives, « le discours » mensonger n’est donc pas un discours *déviant* (comme le discours manipulateur) mais un discours qui détruit la discursivité même car il détruit le fond contractuel basé précisément sur la *structuralité* et sur une certaine *conventionalité* (Parret, 1978: 28). Si la manipulation se présente comme une limite de l’argumentation publique, le mensonge dépasse les limites acceptées de la discursivité, tous les deux ayant, en fait, quelque chose en commun avec la pathologie discursive, leur présence de plus en plus « consistante » dans les discours politiques étant une réelle menace pour la santé sociale en général.

Quoiqu’elle soit concise et fragmentée, cette présentation de quelques aspects et connexions du terme « manipulation », nous montre que les débats que la théorie et sa pratique suscitent sont extrêmement nombreux. En outre, les publications éditoriales sur ce thème sont riches. Par conséquent, il y a au moins une interrogation justifiée: quelle est la différence entre l’étude d’Andreas Edmüller et Thomas Wilhelm et les autres travaux qui traitent le même sujet ou, en d’autres mots, pourquoi choisir cette étude parmi la multitude de titres similaires?

Il faut préciser dès le début que l’étude *La Manipulation. Théorie + training. L’art d’influencer à votre portée* (la version en français de l’étude *Manipulations techniken*, parue chez Rudolf Haufe Verlag en 2009) s’inscrit dans la catégorie des approches récentes de la manipulation dans le sens qu’elle envisage un public actuel, situé dans la sphère des relations professionnelles (post)modernes ainsi que dans celle du quotidien et de ses défis. Par conséquent, les auteurs (ayant une solide formation philosophique et de l’expérience pédagogique) choisissent comme genre d’écriture le guide en raison de sa concision, sa clarté et sa précision, des qualités visibles dans l’exposé graphique de l’étude qui semble promettre une initiation rigoureuse immédiate. En outre, l’étude est riche en exemples pour chaque repère théorique présenté ainsi qu’en illustrations qui contiennent des cas pertinents, d’actualité, expliqués en détail.

Ayant pour point de départ la définition opérationnelle de la manipulation qui décrit le concept comme étant « l’emploi conscient ou inconscient de comportements déloyaux » (p. 15) ainsi que la perception de la multitude de situations de communication dans lesquelles on peut utiliser des stratégies manipulatrices (négociations, conversations entre amis, discussions critiques, etc.), les auteurs insistent
sur les prémisses qui soutiennent l’ensemble de la démarche. Par conséquent, l’aspect considéré comme étant le plus important est l’identification de la manipulation par les lecteurs et non pas la mémorisation d’un long exposé théorique qui parle de la manipulation. L’identification des techniques manipulatrices, des stratégies d’influence incorrectes dans divers contextes concrets constitue le vrai but de l’étude. En même temps, une bonne connaissance des divers types de manipulation, de la psychologie du manipulateur et du manipulé constituée, en fait, le point de départ pour la description d’une vision éthique de la communication. Dans ce sens, le guide propose également, à part les moyens de reconnaître les techniques et stratégies de manipulation, une série de méthodes pour réagir en ayant recours à des « mesures loyales ». Les auteurs soutiennent de cette façon, l’idée conformément à laquelle il est non seulement juste, d’un point de vue moral, mais aussi efficace, de remplacer les actions manipulatrices par des actions objectives et loyales. Ainsi, l’ensemble de la démarche peut être lu et interprété comme un plaidoyer sincère pour l’argumentation, l’intégrité dans la défense des intérêts, la justesse de la communication interpersonnelle et la discussion critique.

Un des sous-textes les plus profonds de l’étude se veut un signal d’alarme en ce qui concerne l’actualité et l’utilisation vaste de la manipulation, chose qui justifie la nécessité de savoir comment se protéger contre la violence du discours manipulateur, qui utilise n’importe quels moyens afin de pouvoir persuader. De la même manière, Philippe Breton soulignait, dans ses ouvrages qui ont traité cette problématique (Breton, 2001, 2006), le fait que la manipulation avait la tendance à devenir une instance centrale de la société, une forme contemporaine de manifestation du pouvoir. L’auteur français soutient le fait que le recours à la manipulation est assez présent au sein de la démocratie et que cela a réussi à corroder la démocratie et à rendre fragile le liant social de telle façon qu’apprendre à déchiffrer, d’une manière précise, les messages qui nous sont transmis devient un impératif.

On observe ainsi la préoccupation commune des chercheurs du phénomène de la manipulation de répondre à une question clé, extrêmement concrète, c’est-à-dire: « qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire afin de se protéger contre la manipulation? ». Philippe Breton nous propose « d’exercer notre responsabilité individuelle » et « d’apprendre à décoder » avec, quand même, une mention précieuse: « apprendre à être des êtres non-influencables tout en restant disponibles pour les autres » (Breton, 2006: 156). Ce « refus sincère » nous redéfini comme étant des êtres libres, qui interviennent de façon intelligente dans une situation, en essayant, en même temps, de rouvrir, à un niveau supérieur et honnête, la possibilité de communiquer et de négocier d’une manière authentique qui respecte la diversité des opinions et des moyens de soutenir ses propres intérêts.

Dans une perspective problématologique, Michel Meyer met en avant l’idée conformément à laquelle la manipulation, la séduction et l’information sont des possibilités inscrites dans la nature même de la discursivité (Meyer, 1993). Il soutient aussi qu’il y aura toujours deux types d’usage rhétorique, un usage critique, lucide par rapport au discours et à ses procédés (la rhétorique blanche) et un autre usage qui cherchera à manipuler le public, à imposer certaines idées par la dissimulation des mécanismes discursifs mis en jeu afin d’accomplir ce but (la rhétorique noire). M. Meyer conclut que le vrai problème ainsi que sa solution se retrouvent au niveau du pathos, de l’acceptation ou du rejet des intentions du discours (qui, dans l’opinion de l’auteur, désigne la recherche des questions qui se cachent derrière les affirmations).

A leur tour, Andreas Edmüller et Thomas Wilhelm mettent en évidence les méthodes pour contrecarrer les procès manipulateurs de telle façon que chaque section
contient une explicitation de celles-ci (voir, par exemple, le chapitre intitulé « Comment réagir également », pp. 33-60, chapitre passant en revue une série importante de techniques telles : « interroger et écouter, concrétiser la conversation en demandant les précisions, débloquer la situation, se mettre à la place de l’autre, interrompre une conversation, faire l’âne et répéter, jouer les perroquets, etc. ). En même temps, une partie significative de l’étude constitue un training important afin de pouvoir identifier les tactiques manipulatrices et de pouvoir choisir la méthode de protection la plus efficace. L’organisation de cette activité de préparation et formation représente l’un des atouts incontestables de l’étude. Les dialogues proposés, les solutions indiquées pour chaque situation et les conseils pratiques rendent facile la compréhension de la façon dont la manipulation fonctionne et mettent en évidence, en même temps, les meilleurs chemins à suivre afin de l’éviter élégamment. En outre, tout comme pour le reste des chapitres, les auteurs garantissent que « les méthodes évoquées sont simples, ne requièrent aucune connaissance occulte ni formation théorique particulières » (p. 157).

La chose la plus remarquable, du point de vue de cette « garantie », est aussi l’effort des deux auteurs de rendre facile à comprendre et d’illustrer d’une manière excellente les arguments fallacieux les plus utilisés et les pièges de l’argumentation. Ces efforts qui ont connu un grand succès ne sont pas du tout à négliger, notamment en raison du fait que la problématique liée à la logique, à la théorie et à la pratique de l’argumentation est difficile. Par conséquent, on synthétise et on met en évidence la tactique manichéiste (qui est, en fait, une disjonction exclusive), le faux dilemme, l’analogie, le sophisme de l’autorité, l’attaque personnelle, le cercle vicieux et beaucoup d’autres aspects.

Cette manière générale de traiter un thème aussi complexe que celui proposé par Andreas Edmüller et Thomas Wilhelm ouvre aussi la problématique sinistre de la relation entre l’utilité et la scientificité – en quelle mesure « la vulgarisation » de certains sujets implique-t-elle une diminution du degré de scientificité de la perspective dont on traite les sujets respectifs? La nécessité – par exemple, dans le cas des guides – d’« abréger » la théorie et d’éluder certaines explications ou fondements théoriques difficiles ou trop techniques en faveur de résumer les caractéristiques les plus importantes qui ont une « finalité » pratique et précise est donc très évidente. Toutefois, cette situation n’implique pas une présentation théorique « peu appropriée » mais juste une « schématisation » adaptée au but envisagé. Ce qui est aussi important, ce sont les mécanismes par l’intermédiaire desquels on peut obtenir la performance discursive ou actionnelle envisagée, ainsi que le public cible de l’étude (compte tenu du fait que plus le public est nombreux plus les données théoriques seront plus light, et les illustrations, plus riches). En adoptant les termes utilisés par Chaïm Perelman et Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, ce qui reste le plus important, c’est le concept de public, la relation qui s’établit entre l’auteur (orateur) et le public étant un des facteurs déterminants de la réussite ou de l’échec discursif, surtout parce que l’« on retrouve les mêmes techniques d’argumentation à tous les niveaux, au niveau de la discussion familiale autour de la table ainsi qu’au niveau d’un débat ayant lieu dans un milieu très spécialisé » (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958 : 10). Si l’on tient compte, outre cela, du fait qu’une argumentation correcte représente un signe / une partie intégrante du discours scientifique et que certains chercheurs ont soutenu l’idée de la dimension argumentative de n’importe quel genre de discours, on ne peut donc pas priver les discours « utiles » de leur partie de scientificité. Ainsi, Ruth Amossy considère qu’il y a de différents degrés d’argumentativité dans n’importe quel type de texte, soit-il polémique, informatif ou descriptif et que même les textes qui semblent ne rien argumenter contiennent, en fait, une partie argumentative (Amossy, 2003 : 13-16). Cette chose se passe, dans l’opinion de l’auteur, parce que tout
texte est soumis à une double contrainte qui tient, d’un côté, des règles spécifiques du genre auquel le texte respectif appartient et, de l’autre côté, des règles qui définissent l’intentionnalité, parfois dissimulée, de tout discours, d’attester ou de confirmer quelque chose (discours testimonial).

Même si celui-ci reste un problème ouvert, l’équilibre entre les deux parties intégrantes – l’utilité et la scientificité – est, toutefois, difficile à accomplir. Dans le cas de l’étude qui nous a fourni ces réflexions, cet équilibre est facile à saisir et représente, une fois de plus, un mérite incontestable. Même si elle affirme dès le début sa finalité éminemment pratique visant « l’entraînement » et l’initiation aux techniques de manipulation et de rejet de ses effets, l’étude repose, en fait, sur une base théorique solide qui constitue seulement un point de départ spécifique. L’utilité, le caractère concret et l’exercice restent les points de repère de cette démarche qui n’est rien du tout construite sur un château de sable.

Rédigée dans un style attrayant, concise et riche en exemples et dialogues pratiques, La Manipulation. Théorie + training. L’art d’influencer à votre portée peut être considérée comme une référence nécessaire pour ceux qui sont intéressés à identifier, comprendre et contrecarrer de manière élégante la manipulation en action. L’analyse habile des procédés manipulateurs ainsi que l’ingénieux appareil illustratif offert aux lecteurs, mis à part le training loyal, construisent une image cohérente de la manipulation dans la société contemporaine. Loin de s’enfoncer dans un négativisme triste ou dans un pessimisme actionnel, les auteurs expriment leur conviction que ceux qui déjouent les stratégies manipulatrices sont capables de construire une communication basée sur l’argumentation et l’honnêteté. En d’autres mots, « celui qui parvient à contourner les tentatives manipulatrices de l’autre n’a pas besoin de devenir lui-même manipulateur » (p. 272).

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